On Tamazight in institutions and linguistic alienation - Mimoun Amsbrid
The “Amazigh issue” has recently returned to the media circulation of all kinds, after the new government and the elected bodies began exercising their constitutional duties.
The follower of the Amazigh path in its linguistic aspect notes without effort that it has been in place since at least 1994 (the date of the inclusion of the “Dialects Bulletin” on public television). For a quarter of a century, despite the Amazigh breakthroughs at the symbolic, constitutional, legal and, to a lesser extent, procedural levels, the “elites” with their various positions, affiliations, and fields of intervention are still governed, consciously or unconsciously, by a superior vision towards Tamazight, implanted by a century of Arabization and Westernization. In the cultural and linguistic imagination of successive generations of Moroccans. As soon as we descend from the skies of speeches and slogans to the ground of practical reality, the reality of institutions: from elected bodies and public utilities such as education, administration and the judiciary… until the symptoms of the cultural-linguistic subconscious that is implanted in the form of individual attitudes and institutional behaviors jump to the surface.
Both of them obstruct the normalization movement with the Amazigh by emptying the gains contained in the royal speeches and the constitutional document (pending a constitutional amendment that equalizes the two official languages of the state, without hierarchical discrimination as is the case in the current constitution), and even in the “organizational law” which was formulated as It seems to accompany the Tamazight in the last stage of its death.
Recognition of Amazigh in Morocco is still just ink on paper
And if you mention the linguistic imagination and subconscious that govern the attitude of the “elites” towards Amazigh, it is because this position is similar to what psychoanalysis has observed from the manifestations of the unconscious stock at the level of behavior even in its most rational forms. Apparently. Thus, we find members of these “elites” justifying rational considerations, some of which are Sunni (the multiplicity of Berber dialects), some of which are technical, logistical, and some of which is financial, my budget… In fact, they are nothing but arrogances (alibis) through which they disburse the stifled cultural-linguistic subconscious mentioned. . That is because while they invoke these pretexts and justify those “ills,” they do nothing to overcome them; Rather, they are working to perpetuate it so that they can continue to prevent Tamazight from institutionalizing for “objective” reasons.
She also mentioned the linguistic subconscious (in the meaning here) because the beholder of the problem of integrating Tamazight in institutions is not difficult for him to notice that the matter, in large part, is a Berber-Amazigh problem. The clearest evidence of this is the quarrel that took place recently in Parliament between the Amazigh Minister of Justice (Al-Soussi) and the head of the Harki team, also the Amazigh, after the first refused to answer in Tamazight a question in the same language posed to him by a deputy from the same team, citing the inability to communicate between the questioner and the respondent.
This is despite the fact that the deputy’s question was formulated in words from the common Berber lexicon, which any Berber speaker can understand, whatever his dialect; Although the minister had received - according to the established procedure - the Arabic version of the question. The Amazigh-speaking minister’s refusal to answer in Tamazight a question posed in Tamazight is nothing but a confirmation of what we explained above about the fact that institutional linguistic behaviors expose the cultural-linguistic subconscious of the elites: that unconsciousness based on the fact that Tamazight, by its nature, cannot be an institutional communication tool of any kind. (It is the same subconscious that makes the Arabic and French languages monopolize this role, even though many of the parties to that “communication” are not mastered either by sending or receiving, as evidenced by “linguistic scenes” that have become a rich material for laughter and laughter in social media.
In fact, these two languages were never subjected to an evaluation based on communicative efficiency, but were entrusted with the advancement - in the Moroccan context - with a ritual function (rituelle), which is to suggest institutional distance, in the sense of notifying the supposed public that it is about a special type of utterance: institutional utterance. And let communication go to hell! And let the institutional monologue rule!).
The manufactured linguistic subconscious, based on the acceptance of cultural-linguistic alienation as a condition for affiliation with the socio-cultural formation emanating from the policy of Arabization and Westernization of the Amazigh-speaking “elites,” has been able to make it a factor of resistance to its actual inclusion in institutions; Thus, it raises the embarrassment of the traditional anti-Tamazight.
The attitude of the Berber-speaking “elites” towards their language takes a caricatured form when it comes to collective electors who run rural and semi-rural groups (although they are classified as urban), located in the depth of monolingual Berber areas, which were not Arabized except through the school. Where we find these elected people straining themselves to utter a rhetoric that evokes both ridicule and pity, neither in Arabic nor in Tamazight, due to their lack of mastery of the former and their insistence, however, to “communicate” with it. What prevents these elected officials from communicating in their Tamazight language, which they speak lightly, agitatedly, before and after the sessions? Isn't it related to the "Amazigh knot" that is deeply rooted in many of its speakers who work in public affairs? A complex that finds its origin in the cultural-linguistic subconscious that was installed in Moroccans by a century of Arabization and Westernization.
The linguistic behavior of these elected and other Berber-speaking officials reminds me of the practice of one of my early emigrants to Europe: he would send tapes to his Berber family in the countryside, in which he was striving to speak in ludicrous “Arabic” because of his almost complete ignorance of it; This is in his belief that the Amazigh language is not capable of being recorded on tape; and that he must speak Arabic if he wants to “communicate” with his family in the country; Those parents who - what a funny weeping irony - do not
! understand anything of it
Not far from this strange linguistic behavior is the behavior of many of those who are invited to speak on radio and television “Berber-speaking” among the educated and educated working in various sectors related to the lives of citizens. As soon as the microphone is presented to them, their Berbers will leave them and nothing remains
! of them except the prepositional and adverb sheep
Returning to the linguistic behavior of the Amazigh-speaking elected officials and officials, which is the acceptance of the happy linguistic alienation that results in postponing the integration of Tamazight into institutions, it must be recognized that the Amazigh movement is largely responsible for this situation (but the first and last responsibility rests with the Moroccan state, which has accepted cultural alienation The linguistic is a belief, thus sacrificing its identity and originality for the sake of ideological Arabism that has no support from history, geography, or people. The responsibility of the movement lies in the fact that, for decades, it was content with cultural work, which, despite its necessity, remains elitist, no matter how broad the base of its targets.
This, while she had to combine cultural work and political work. The latter is the one who made it break into institutions at all levels and fields of operation: legislative, executive, representative and administrative. It is the reluctance of the Amazigh movement to engage in politics in its noble sense (managing the affairs of the city) that has kept these institutions in the hands of the anti-Amazigh and happy alienated speakers of the aforementioned type.
Political action in the aforementioned sense begins with engaging in social work in all its fields. Because it allows contact with the citizens and gets to know their concerns and needs, while taking appropriate initiatives to bridge the gaps in institutional work as much as possible, or pleading for them with the relevant authorities... The language among Amazigh speakers, on the other hand, and to remove the suspicions promoted by anti-Amazigh Islamists and nationalists who are sympathetic to the Amazigh movement: its nature and goals...
Nothing prevents a social actor, who has gained social legitimacy through field practice, from translating his social commitment into a political commitment by applying to the various electoral elections in order to represent his citizens. By storming the legislative, executive and administrative institutions, the political actor coming from the Amazigh movement will be able to contribute to transforming these institutions that obstruct the movement to integrate Tamazight into public life into factors and tools to accelerate that movement. However, if the Amazigh movement remains withdrawn from seasonal and elite cultural work, despising political work, we will continue to send anti-Amazigh and happy alienated speakers of it to these institutions. We will continue to watch in frustration those hilarious and weeping scenes in which the Amazighs proudly despise themselves.
That, and it does not matter the political framework within which the Amazigh actor operates: the most important is the personal conviction that would create blocs that work in the interest of the Amazigh or, at least, counteract the will to obstruct its integration into the public service on pretexts that are in fact just pretexts.
The Amazigh movement has already known agitation in this direction during the period before the last legislative and collective elections. It is premature to make a comprehensive assessment of participation in political action from within the existing parties. This is for two reasons, one of which is: the small number of actors from the Amazigh movement who joined it; And the other: the short period of time for practice.
However, this precaution does not prevent us from recording the fact that the scores issued by the recently elected institutions do not give rise to optimism. But giving in to despair and frustration while crying over Amazigh ruins is not a solution anyway. Rather, the solution is more social work translated politically, leading to storming the fortresses of obstructing the Amazigh by procrastination and emptying the gains from their practical implications.
And for the happy amazigh-speaking plunderers, it is said: Be
! ashamed of yourselves