The Amazigh Spring: government officials remember… too[1]. By Said DOUMANE*
The Amazigh Spring: government officials remember… too[1]. By Said DOUMANE* 11834
As time passes, tongues loosen. We must rejoice even if the history of the Amazigh Spring, like that of the national liberation movement, risks being overused, crushed, even falsified until it is emptied of its substance and its liberating potential.
All testimonies are good to take but it is first up to the actors directly or indirectly involved in the movement, to the attentive observers and then to the specialists (historians, political scientists, sociologists, etc.) to establish the veracity of the facts, the roles and responsibilities actors, individual and collective, and to extract the socio-political and cultural determinants.
on the other side of the mirror
My purpose in this article consists in reviewing the declarations or testimonies of three important personalities of the Algerian power, important because of the high official functions that they ensured during the Kabyle revolt of 1980 and their implications in its "management" and its repression. These three personalities can be cited by name as long as they have written and signed their testimonies in good conscience and in complete freedom. They are Mr Hamid SIDI SAÏD, Wali of Tizi-Ouzou, Mr Abdelhak BERERHI, Minister of Higher Education and Mr El Hadi KHEDIRI, Director General of National Security.
These statements or testimonies made exceptionally [1]known to the public by their authors, are interesting to read, question, comment on or analyze not for what they are likely to bring new in terms of information or disclosure of secrets (they tell us almost nothing what we did not already know) but by what they can signify politically and psychologically on the state of mind of those who govern and the mechanisms of governance of society. In this kind of analytical exercise, caution and hindsight are good advice so as not to fall into inappropriate judgments about men who have assumed high political responsibilities in a system from which they were , perhaps, victims too. Anachronistic comments are often a source of unconscious judgments!
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This digression made, let us return to the speeches of our three leaders, of which I will try to point out what seems to me to be the most significant. To this end, I opt for two convergent approaches: a/ implicit resemblances and invariants b/ quasi-explicit statements and confessions.
a/ In the first analysis, we can draw, it seems to me, a first lesson from the titles of their articles as they immediately reveal a deep political, if not existential, turmoil. Breaches of ethics, faults or abuses that are difficult to assume. Indeed, these titles reflect striking moods:
H. SIDI SAID: a wali in the turmoil of the “Amazigh spring”
A. BERERHI: a democratic detonator: testimony, analyzes and reflections
E. KHEDIRI: how we avoided the fracture
Indeed, these statements are quite telling. But it is by going a little deeper into the texts that these titles illustrate, that we can glimpse the political and psychological profiles of their authors who, as obligated and trusted by the system they serve willy-nilly, struggle to hide their inner tears. Crushed themselves by this system, they realize, in paroxysmal moments, the role of cog or instrument that they play in the repressive machine. The most dramatic case is El Hadi KHEDIRI: here is a man who suffered incarceration and torture in the sinister penitentiary of Tazoult-Lambèse just after independence, who himself became chief of police twenty years later and therefore directly or indirectly responsible for the arrests and abuse suffered by his compatriots. When I took over the management of the police, I tried to modify its operation by changing the supervisory staff. Was it enough? In hindsight, I realize not. In order to reform the police and bring them to act within the law, it is necessary that the law prevails in all sectors. Can we arrive one day? Thirty years after the Amazigh spring, the country has not come out of the inn. There was October 1988, there was the decade of 1990…” [2] A real tragedy for a man who, with a “mathematics” bachelor’s degree in 1955 and enrolled for scientific studies at the University of Algiers, opted for the maquis in 1956.
The Amazigh Spring: government officials remember… too[1]. By Said DOUMANE* 1--496
Infernal Suction
The other two senior civil servants are hardly outdone, even if they do not report directly to the law enforcement services. They were originally trainers (one, HSS, was a school principal, the other, AB, professor of histology-embryology) and a few years later find themselves inserted into a politico-bureaucratic machine which has away from their primary vocations. A. BERERHI has in vain denounced the Arabization of education or what he described as “a  bad start to independence with the famous phrase; we are Arabs, we are Arabs, we are Arabs” [3] , the failure of the Algerian school, “the State has failed terribly at school” [4], he cannot exonerate himself from his responsibility for the collapse of the Algerian university of which he was minister. As for H. SIDI SAÎD, as Wali, he cannot decently conceal his responsibility in the prohibition of Mouloud Mammeri's conference on ancient Kabyle poetry in March 1980 at the University Center of Tizi-Ouzou. [5] According to him, it was the leader of the FLN, Mohamed Salah YAHIAOUI, who took the decision to ban this but he adds, naive or outdated: "  the reason for this decision being the risk of disturbing public order , it is therefore up to the Wali to take the necessary measures so that Mr. Mouloud MAMMERI does not present himself at the University Center “  [6] .
In total, the three authorities, each at their own level, try to minimize their responsibilities as much as possible in the repression of the “Amazigh spring” while acknowledging their impotence in the face of a logic of power that is beyond them!
b/ Secondly, it is a question of highlighting through the statements and affirmations of these leaders, their uneasiness in the face of facts and situations which titillate their consciences. Quotes:
H. SIDI SAID; “…when several establishments were the prey of the flames and the city of TIzi-Ouzou isolated, I felt terribly the weight of my responsibility when Prime Minister Si ABDELGHANI at the end of a long communication asked me the fateful question of knowing if we needed reinforcements. In other words, should the army be called in? I answered after a few moments of hesitation that it was not necessary. [7]
The Amazigh Spring: government officials remember… too[1]. By Said DOUMANE* 1--497
A. BEREHI: “ The dialogue was established from the start, both by Wali SIDI SAÏD who showed a great sense of listening and responsibility, as well as by myself in TIzi-Ouzou and Algiers. This approach took precedence over the repressive approach and contributed a lot to appeasement. Without any exaggeration, a bloodbath was certainly avoided, contrary to what happened in 2001 …” [8] .
E. KHEDIRI:  “At the height of the clashes between the security forces and the demonstrators, some officials insisted on sending in the army. Kasdi MERBAH who was Secretary General of the Ministry of National Defense and I were firmly opposed”. [9]
All three try to justify or explain their actions or inactions by arguing, rightly or wrongly, that they were mere executors of orders and decisions emanating from their hierarchy and of which they were sometimes unaware. the origin of the principals. Examples:
H. SIDI SAÏD: “The Mouhafedh and I made a presentation on the evolution of the situation, reaffirming our desire to continue to sensitize all those who could contribute to a return to calm. After our intervention we were invited to withdraw and wait in the salons of the ZIROUT Youcef palace. We did not take part in the debate, which lasted until 11 p.m., when Mohamed Salah YAHIAOUI received us to announce the decision to evacuate the University Center on April 20 in the morning. He told us that the security services had been instructed to make the necessary arrangements . » [10]
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A. BERERHI: “  The intervention of the police was mentioned to evacuate the university center. I categorically opposed it, citing in particular the academic franchises to be respected and the negative consequences that would result. I was followed by my fellow ministers as well as the head of the UGTA and the Wali (…). In fact the decision was taken against our advice and without our knowledge …” [11] .
E. KHRDIRI:  “On the evening of April 19, a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister brought together the heads of the various security services: Yazid ZERHOUNI, head of military security, Mustapha CHELLOUFI, commander of the national gendarmerie, and myself for the DGSN. Agenda: give us instructions to restore order in the occupied faculties. I had tried to explain the situation by de-dramatizing it, and tried to convince that force was not the appropriate solution. Storming the campuses to brutally dislodge the students risked leading to a serious mistake. In vain. At my insistence, the Prime Minister violently took me to task. I'm tired of hearing you lecture me every time, he repeated angrily. Then he left the meeting.[12] .
Out of the malaise and malaise caused by the feeling of powerlessness, our three leaders end up expressing, but a posteriori and in restrained terms, a certain inner questioning (problem of conscience?) which pushes them to ask, at least to touch on the political and ideological failings that plague their countries. They even suggest, half-words, issues that militants of the Berber movement refer to as the national question and the refoundation of the Algerian state. Quotes:
H. SIDI SAÏD: “  In this contribution, I have tried to relate the facts as I experienced them as a representative of the State whose responsibility was fully engaged, even when the decisions which had triggered or precipitated the events had been taken at other levels (….). I think I accomplished this mission with the deep conviction of the one who was the only one to measure the double price of his possible failure: for the senior official invested with the invaluable confidence of the Algerian State, and for the son of the region, knowing perfectly what Kabylie never forgives its children” [13] .
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A. BERERHI  : “April 80 triggered a profound democratic movement which continued and grew stronger over time against a power which, by its sole concern to persist at all costs, allowed the seeds of radicalization to develop (…. ). The refoundation of the State and all its structures and institutions is essential, with a State of law, freedoms, social justice, as well as the recovery of the sovereignty of the people, as dreamed of by the artisans and combatants of the 1 November 1954″ [14] .
E. KHEDIRI: “  Mistrust of Kabyle particularism goes back to what was called the Berberism of the 1940s, it continued during the Revolution and the Congress and the Soummam (….). Why then this singularization of Kabylie? When I was in power, I did not understand the distrust that this region aroused among certain officials who multiplied the warnings against the dangers that it could represent. When I learned of the ban, by certain local authorities, of the Mouloud Mammeri(s conference, I was furious. The operation was remotely controlled from Algiers” [15] .
I conclude this foray into the writings of the official protagonists of the "Berber spring" by noting that after the repression of April 1980 and those that followed (1985, 1988, 1990s, 2001... and those in progress since 2019, the The suffering of the victims has hardly shaken the consciences of those responsible.To dilute one's responsibility in the functioning of an impersonal and faceless system is a very convenient argument.

*Retired university professor, former vice-rector of Mouloud Mammeri University, Tizi-Ouzou. Former animator of the Amazigh Cultural Movement.



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